International Coalition for Human Rights (ICHR)
Urgent early-warning communication
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URGENT EARLY WARNING — IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

Chemical Weapons Threat in Damazin Endangers Civilian Lives

Report date: 13 November 2026

Item	Details
Reference	ICHR/SDN/EW/2026
Date	13 November 2026
Classification	**Urgent early warning — immediate action required**
Field source	Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory, Blue Nile State
Subject	Suspected chemical or toxic munitions stored at army facilities adjoining Blue Nile University and residential districts in Ed Damazin

To:

- Mr Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights — Geneva
- Ms Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission — Brussels
- Dr Annette Weber, EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
- Chair, Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) — European Parliament

Copy to: UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan · Director-General of the OPCW · European Commission — Preparedness and Crisis Management

المنظمة السودانية للسلام - الراصد الحقوقي
Sudanese Organization for Peace - Human Rights Observatory
المقر الرئيسي: بابوس، النيل الأزرق (الفونج الجديدة)، السودان

Field source of the monitoring in section I

Excellencies,

Why we are writing now

The International Coalition for Human Rights addresses you with this early warning because Ed Damazin, capital of Blue Nile State, stands on the edge of a disaster that can be prevented today and will not be reversible tomorrow.

Three elements now converge in one place:

1. Field monitoring indicates that the Sudanese Armed Forces are storing munitions suspected of carrying chemical or toxic warheads inside a military compound separated from Blue Nile University by a single street.
2. A documented international record concerning these same forces: a permanent member of the Security Council determined that they used chemical weapons in 2024, and repeated demands within the OPCW, including from the European Union, for clarification, transparency and independent verification.
3. A city at the centre of military operations, struck repeatedly by drones in recent weeks, hosting tens of thousands of displaced people.

Together these three elements leave no margin for delay. We hold the Sudanese Armed Forces, as the party that chose and controls these sites, fully responsible for any harm to civilians that follows.

I. What the Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory recorded

On 11 November 2026 the Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory issued an urgent international appeal based on field monitoring, open-source analysis (OSINT) and satellite imagery matching. The Coalition adopts that appeal and brings it to you.

Element observed	What the information indicates
Main compound	Headquarters of the Artillery Corps (east wing) and the Engineering Corps (west wing) in central Ed Damazin, immediately north of Blue Nile University
Heavy weapons	Multiple-barrel rocket launchers (30- and 40-tube systems) in the artillery motor pool
Stores and shelters	Reportedly used to store munitions suspected of carrying chemical or toxic warheads
Supply routes	Cross the civilian heart of the city, passing university, government and religious facilities, as far as the industrial zone



Precise coordinates and route details are set out in confidential Annex A, addressed solely to the competent verification bodies. What gives this information its weight is not the detail alone, but the context in which it arrives.

II. A question pending for two years now has an address

This is not the first time the Sudanese Armed Forces have been linked to chemical weapons. The file has been before the OPCW since 2025 and remains open without independent verification on the ground.

Date	Actor	Position
2025	**United States**	**Determined, under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024, and imposed a first round of sanctions**
October 2025	**European Union (110th Executive Council)**	**Expressed concern at the allegations of use, confirmed the Executive Council had been notified under Article IX(4), and demanded prompt clarification**
July 2026	**United States (112th session)**	**Announced that its independent technical analysis concluded the Sudanese Armed Forces used chemical weapons in 2024, and demanded a full declaration and immediate, unrestricted access for inspectors**
July 2026	**Chad (Executive Council)**	**Warned that any possession or use of chemical weapons in Sudan threatens the security and stability of neighbouring states**
October 2026	**Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium and Australia (113th session)**	**Germany pointed to published indicators of an undeclared chemical programme; the others called on Sudan to complete its investigation and report its findings**

The Sudanese authorities deny these allegations, and their national committee submitted an interim report stating that it found no evidence for them. States Parties replied that domestic mechanisms are no substitute for treaty compliance or independent verification, and more than a year after the Executive Council was notified, the clarification the European Union demanded has still not been provided.

The Ed Damazin warning raises no new question. It gives the pending question a specific address: what is stored, where, and how far from the university's students?

III. The university and the neighbourhoods on the contact line

The choice of site is not a technical detail. It is a military decision for which the command is responsible.


- Two corps headquarters, rocket launchers and stores suspected of holding toxic material, all one street away from a university attended daily by students, faculty and staff.
- The compound is surrounded by populated residential districts, not by a buffer zone.
- Supply routes do not bypass the city; they cut through it, passing university, government and religious facilities.

International humanitarian law obliges the party controlling the area to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and to remove civilians from the vicinity of such objectives. What the information indicates is the opposite: military objectives planted among civilians and kept there.

Keeping these assets where they are, in a city under attack, admits only two readings: gross recklessness towards civilian life, or shelter behind civilian presence. Both entail direct legal responsibility for the military command.

This conduct is not isolated from a wider pattern in how the armed forces treat civilians and protected facilities. The Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale University confirmed, in its report No. 72 of 24 March 2026, an attack by the Sudanese Armed Forces on Ed Daein Teaching Hospital.

Visual annex 1: the military compound and Blue Nile University



Insert here a dated satellite image marking the compound, its east and west wings and the university perimeter. Source: satellite imagery matching, Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory; coordinates in confidential Annex A.

IV. A city in the line of fire

Ed Damazin is not a depot in the desert. It is a city under attack and crowded with displaced people. That is what turns a potential risk into an imminent one.

- **The strikes:** the city has faced repeated drone attacks since September, including strikes on the night of 3–4 November 2026. The Yale lab recorded damage to civilian and military facilities in the city between 29 October and 4 November, and the authorities cut the power as a precaution.
- **Displacement:** some 100,000 people were displaced within the state between January and September, nearly half of them sheltering in Ed Damazin itself.
- **The river:** the city sits on the bank of the Blue Nile, close to the Roseires Dam, one of the country's main water and power facilities.

In this setting, any one of three moments is enough for disaster:

1. A strike on the stores, detonating their contents in front of the university and in the heart of the neighbourhoods.
2. An accident or fire during storage, or during transport through the city streets.
3. Use of these munitions in a populated area.

In any of these cases the result would be mass casualties among students, families and displaced people, in a city whose health facilities are already exhausted. The harm would not stop at the city limits: any release reaching the Blue Nile would be carried downstream to towns and farming schemes that depend on its water, as far as Khartoum and beyond.


V. An approach driving the region towards open conflict

What is happening in Ed Damazin is not a local matter. It is one link in an approach by which the command of the armed forces is leading the country, and the region with it, towards open-ended conflict.

- **Geography:** Blue Nile State borders Ethiopia and South Sudan, and the Blue Nile is a transboundary river. A chemical incident here would not be contained by administrative borders.
- **Neighbours' concern:** Chad warned the OPCW Executive Council that any possession or use of such weapons in Sudan threatens the security of neighbouring states.
- **The military-victory option:** diplomatic sources reported that the EU Special Representative warned the army chief in September 2026 against pursuing a military solution and against the conflict spreading across the Horn of Africa.

When insistence on military victory, the militarisation of cities, suspected storage of prohibited munitions and the absence of any independent international verification all converge, this is not the conduct of a war. It is an approach that closes the door on settlement and widens the conflict, and the command of the armed forces bears political and legal responsibility for it.

SUDAN - BLUE NILE STATE: REGIONAL MAP SHOWING BORDERS, ROSEIRES DAM, AND THE BLUE NILE RIVER



VI. Legal framework and responsibility

The obligations raised by this warning bind Sudan by treaty and under customary law, and do not depend on the findings of any national investigation.

Obligation	Source	What it means in Ed Damazin
Prohibition on developing, stockpiling and using chemical weapons	Article I, Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)	**Any storage of chemical munitions in the city is a direct breach of the Convention**
Full declaration of any chemical weapons or facilities	Article III of the Convention	**The duty to declare stands whatever national committees conclude**
Clarification and challenge inspection	Article IX of the Convention	**Any State Party may request clarification, or an on-site challenge inspection of any suspect site**
Prohibition on use in all conflicts	Customary IHL (ICRC Rule 74)	**Use is a war crime, in international and non-international conflicts alike**
Precautions against the effects of attacks	Article 58, Additional Protocol I; customary rules 22–24	**Avoid locating military objectives in populated areas and remove civilians from their vicinity**
Rights to life, health and education	ICCPR art. 6; ICESCR arts. 12–13; African Charter arts. 4, 16, 17	**Exposing students and residents to toxic substances directly engages these rights**

Individual responsibility

Military commanders bear individual criminal responsibility for any use of prohibited substances, and for any crime they knew of, or should have known of, and failed to prevent. Because the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in Sudan is limited to Darfur under Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), accountability for Blue Nile today runs through the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission, universal jurisdiction in European states, and extension of the Court's jurisdiction to the whole of Sudanese territory.

VII. Our urgent requests

We do not ask you to adopt an accusation before it is verified. We ask you to prevent a disaster before it happens.

To the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

1. Issue a public position on the storage of suspected chemical or toxic munitions near the university and residential districts of Ed Damazin, and call for their immediate removal.
2. Refer this warning and its confidential annex to the Fact-Finding Mission, and include the situation in briefings to the Human Rights Council.
3. Engage the OPCW Technical Secretariat in support of verification.
4. Urge the Sudanese authorities to protect the students and staff of Blue Nile University and to inform residents of the risks.


To the European Union

1. **In The Hague —** raise the matter at the 31st Conference of the States Parties later this month, following up the Union's statement at the 110th session.
2. **Challenge inspection —** encourage member states to request formal clarification on Ed Damazin and to consider an on-site challenge inspection under Article IX.
3. **Restrictive measures —** apply the EU chemical weapons sanctions regime to any individuals or entities found to be involved.
4. **Diplomatic channel —** have the Special Representative for the Horn of Africa raise directly with the army command the removal of dangerous materiel from civilian areas, full declaration, and unrestricted access for inspectors.
5. **European Parliament —** place Ed Damazin on the agenda for an urgency debate or human rights resolution, and hold a hearing in the Subcommittee on Human Rights.
6. **Humanitarian preparedness —** support a health and environmental contingency plan including public warning, preparing health facilities for chemical incidents, and securing safe evacuation routes.
7. **Justice —** support extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to the whole of Sudanese territory.

What we ask of the Sudanese Armed Forces, through your channels


1. **Move the rocket launchers, dangerous materials and heavy materiel immediately outside the built-up area and away from educational institutions.**
2. **Submit a full declaration to the OPCW of any chemical weapons, materials or facilities.**
3. **Grant the Technical Secretariat and the Fact-Finding Mission immediate, unrestricted access to the sites listed in Annex A.**

خطوط الإمداد داخل النسيج المدني (3):



Insert here a city map marking the supply route and its passage by university, government and religious facilities. Route details are in confidential Annex A, addressed to the verification bodies.

Visual annex 4: regional location and the river course



The map shows how close Ed Damazin is to the borders and to the Roseires Dam, and the course of the Blue Nile towards Khartoum and beyond, which would make any release a transboundary event.

Note on the evidentiary position

The field information in this letter rests on monitoring by the Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory, its open-source analysis and its satellite imagery matching. The nature of the stored munitions has not yet been independently verified. That uncertainty, in such a place and at such a time, is not a reason to wait; it is the reason to act.

Conclusion

Excellencies, tomorrow the international community will not be asked whether the information was fully confirmed, but what it did when the warning reached it. Independent verification today costs far less than an inquiry into a disaster tomorrow. We trust you will act before Ed Damazin becomes another name on the list of stricken cities.

Please accept the assurances of our highest consideration,

1- the International Coalition for Human Rights (ICHR)

2- Sudanese Organization for Peace / Human Rights Observatory

References

EU statement to the 110th session of the OPCW Executive Council, October 2025 · The National: US statement to the 112th session, July 2026 · Arms Control Association: the US determination, the two rounds of sanctions and the national committee's response, September 2026 · The Standard: Chad's warning to the Executive Council, July 2026 · Modern Diplomacy: the 113th session and Germany's position, October 2026 · UK statement to the 113th session, 6 October 2026 · Humanitarian Research Lab, Yale University: reports 72 and 82 · Sudan Tribune: damage in Ed Damazin, 29 October to 4 November 2026 · The Standard (AFP): strikes on Ed Damazin and displacement figures, September 2026 · Sudan Tribune: the EU Special Representative's meeting with the army chief, September 2026

CONFIDENTIAL — HAND DELIVERY

Annex A: geographic data

Sent solely to:

- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan.
- The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW.

- Precise coordinates of the compound and its east and west wings.
- Locations of the stores and shelters referred to in section I.
- Supply routes through the city as far as the industrial zone.
- Dated satellite imagery captures used in the matching.

The Sudanese Organization for Peace – Human Rights Observatory places its material at the disposal of any competent verification body, and the International Coalition for Human Rights will facilitate contact. This annex is not to be circulated beyond the bodies listed above, in order to protect field sources.